Is There Good and Evil in Technology?

Evaluating Nuclear and Solar Energy with Philosophy

2026-10-09

There’s a common proposition in political and moral debates about the state of technology – often articulated by tech-savvy people – that a piece of technology has no moral bias and is inherently neutral, as exemplified by the case of a knife: »A knife can be used in a good and in a bad way; you can use it to cut your food or to stab your neighbor. The knife itself, however, has no inclination to one side or the other.« Such an argument is also heard during every gun control discussion.

The problem with this assessment is, however, that it takes a single example – a conveniently trivial one nonetheless – and argues for an abstracted way of thinking about technology in general. With such abstraction, we often risk occluding specifics while turning a blind eye to further investigation, as we tend to acknowledge the whole problem as solved. And it might be very well true for some items, like knives, but is it therefore true for every invention?

A different, intriguing perspective is offered by Langdon Winner in his 1980 paper Do Artifacts Have Politics? which pleads for a more social-constructive view on technology.[1] I’ll give a more detailed explanation of this shortly, but first I have to outline the trail of his thought. For his argumentation, he builds on an idea that was conjectured in an earlier 1964 paper from Lewis Mumford, titled Authoritarian and Democratic Technics. This latter paper is rather short, and, in my opinion, a bit vague and polemic, but the general idea is “that from late neolithic times in the Near East, right down to our own day, two technologies have recurrently existed side by side: one authoritarian, the other democratic, the first system-centered, immensely powerful, but inherently unstable, the other man-centered, relatively weak, but resourceful and durable.”[2]

His most vivid example gives us a rather broad definition of »technology« as he compares the bureaucratic system of the Roman empire with the autonomy of local farmers. While most of the power was centralized in the capital, organized by the inventions of republican politics, the surrounded farming land was mostly decentralized, rather weak on its own but surely not as much in fluctuation as the political situation of the senate.

[E]ven the Roman Empire found it expedient, once resistance was broken and taxes were collected, to consent to a large degree of local autonomy in religion and government. Moreover, as long as agriculture absorbed the labor of some 90 per cent of the population, mass technics were confined largely to the populous urban centers. Since authoritarian technics first took form in an age when metals were scarce and human raw material, captured in war, was easily convertible into machines, its directors never bothered to invent inorganic mechanical substitutes.

The fall of the Roman Empire is thus linked to the property of centralization within the system design. The somewhat technical vocabulary that Mumford uses does remind the reader of similar factors in engineering contexts, where robustness and points of failure are equally considered:

the system had no inner coherence: a break in communication, a missing link in the chain of command, and the great human machines fell apart. Finally, the myths upon which the whole system was based – particularly the essential myth of kingship – were irrational, with their paranoid suspicions and animosities and their paranoid claims to unconditional obedience and absolute power. For all its redoubtable constructive achievements, authoritarian technics expressed a deep hostility to life.

Back to Langdon Winner, we find an interesting adaption of this idea for a more recent technology, as he gives us an interesting angle to talk about the relation of solar and nuclear energy. But before we go ahead of ourselves, I want to be a bit more precise about what it means to have a “social-constructive” approach towards technology. The problem with the knife-example I used in the opening is that it looks at an entity, the »knife«, in a completely isolated way; »the knife in itself« as a Platonist would say. Analyzing entities, be it physical items or metaphysical concepts, in such a way has a millennia-long history in philosophy, with its merits, but there were always people who criticized the fundamental validity of this whole pattern of thinking. A surprisingly clear objection against this kind of philosophy is found in Wittgenstein’s Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus, where he clarifies:

Just as we cannot think of spatial objects at all apart from space, or temporal objects apart from time, so we cannot think of any object apart from the possibility of its connexion with other things.[3]

What this means for social constructivists is that a piece of technology should not be analyzed in itself but always as something that is embedded in a social context — a specific society with a specific set of rules, morals, behavior patterns and “forms of life.” For any philosophical practicability, it is quite meaningless to talk about anything as if it just floats through empty space. And although it is completely understandable and reasonable from an engineering point of view to define a piece of hardware by its pure materialist properties, once it gets integrated into a society, new properties will emerge that are, so to speak, equally inherent to it, even though they don’t have the same empirical qualities.

Here, Winner describes the properties of nuclear and solar energy as they are found both in the hard technology as well as in the order of human life. A nuclear power plant does not only exist by its own physical manifestation made of steel and concrete; its existence demands a whole set of laws and behavior patterns from its environment. Following Mumford’s terminology, nuclear technology is “system-centered”, “immensely powerful” and – down to the chemical vocabulary – “inherently unstable.” To maintain a single nuclear power plant, it is necessary to centralize an unusual amount of economic and human resources within a rigid hierarchy. Such social patterns are then not confined within the space of the plant; as modes of organizing human life, they seep as an ideology into public discourse. Citing a study of business leaders in the US, Winner hints that “patterns of authority that work effectively in the corporation become for businessmen the desirable model against which to compare political and economic relationships in the rest of society.” An even more vivid example is given by a debate that proposes the usage of plutonium to further enrich nuclear energy. Winner writes:

Well-known objections to plutonium recycling focus on its unacceptable economic costs, its risks of environmental contamination, and its dangers in regard to the international proliferation of nuclear weapons. Beyond these concerns, however, stands another less widely appreciated set of hazards — those that involve the sacrifice of civil liberties. The widespread use of plutonium as a fuel increases the chance that this toxic substance might be stolen by terrorists, organized crime, or other persons. This raises the prospect, and not a trivial one, that extraordinary measures would have to be taken to safeguard plutonium from theft and to recover it should the substance be stolen. Workers in the nuclear industry as well as ordinary citizens outside could well become subject to background security checks, covert surveillance, wiretapping, informers, and even emergency measures under martial law — all justified by the need to safeguard plutonium.

Compare all of this with solar energy and we do again find the political properties within the technology, as mentioned by Mumford. With a piece of hardware that any reasonable tech-savvy person is able to install on its own roof, we should indeed be able to make a proper case for calling solar tech as “man-centered, relatively weak, but resourceful and durable.” Of course, there are also huge, centralized solar power plants, and there is probably also the question of who controls the manufacturing process; Winner acknowledges that there isn’t “anything about solar energy [that] requires democracy.” But in his vocabulary, there is a factor of »compatibility« in each tech that does have a say in how much a society tends to accept a certain ideological standpoint. Not only are decentralized concepts by its very nature more durable, although weaker as single units, but by creating a technically viable, people-centered power grid, it gives us reason to think that similar approaches are also worthy a discussion in other political spheres. Winner sums the philosophical standpoint of the proponents of solar energy up:

Their case is, briefly, that solar energy is decentralizing in both a technical and political sense: technically speaking, it is vastly more reasonable to build solar systems in a disaggregated, widely distributed manner than in large-scale centralized plants; politically speaking, solar energy accommodates the attempts of individuals and local communities to manage their affairs effectively because they are dealing with systems that are more accessible, comprehensible, and controllable than huge centralized sources.

Similarly, those advocating for of nuclear energy are not only asking for the centralization of energy production in the hands of those with sufficient economic means; they are proposing a solution that embeds in the whole system of human life where it will shape its surroundings according to its own needs. Humans are creatures of habit, even at thinking, and as technology is an immensely important aspect of our lives, the form of a technical solution will without a doubt have an impact on our thinking in general.

“if you accept nuclear power plants, you also accept a techno-scientific-industrial-military elite. Without these people in charge, you could not have nuclear power.” In this conception some kinds of technology require their social environments to be structured in a particular way in much the same sense that an automobile requires wheels in order to move. The thing could not exist as an effective operating entity unless certain social as well as material conditions were met.

Now I’m not here to argue in favor for one or another ideology; it is always up to the reader to form their own opinion. Even Communism’s sidekick Friedrich Engels argued in his essay On Authority that the belief in a world completely free of authoritarian practices is a hopelessly naive sentiment: “it is absurd to speak of the principle of authority as being absolutely evil, and of the principle of autonomy as being absolutely good. Authority and autonomy are relative things whose spheres vary with the various phases of the development of society.”[4] Different situations will often require different approaches and there are reasons to believe in a chain of command. But if competing political approaches fight for the same space, one should adequately consider the possible side-effects as well which interests are behind the forces that try to steer public decisions towards their own direction.

It is also up for debate how this line of reasoning works with more recent technologies. There is a strong case to make that Bitcoin’s inherent property of decentralization does not meet the promise of being a democratic tool. On the other hand, Fediverse network services like Mastodon or Matrix do have the explicit goal of offering an alternative to social platforms owned by single individuals.


  1. Winner. 1980. Do Artifacts Have Politics?. https://www.jstor.org/stable/20024652. ↩

  2. Mumford. 1964. Authoritarian and Democratic Technics. https://www.jstor.org/stable/3101118. ↩

  3. Wittgenstein. 1921. Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus. § 2.0121. ↩

  4. Engels. 1874. On Authority. https://www.marxists.org/archive/marx/works/1872/10/authority.htm. ↩